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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
CPLR 3121: Party may not retain adversary's expert.
In Gnoi v. City of New York, 011 a malpractice suit, the
physical condition of plaintiff was in issue. Defendant hired
an expert to assist it in determining whether or not it was
negligent. At the trial, this expert was allowed to testify over
defendant's objections, in behalf of plaintiff. The appellate division,
first department, held that this constituted reversible error.
The court stated that "where a party . . . does not lack expert
testimony of his own choosing, an expert engaged by the opposing
party should not be sought out and placed in the unethical position
of accepting a retainer from both sides.""""
CPLR 3126: Substantial attorney's fees imposed.
In spite of the liberal construction of disclosure provisions
under the CPLR, 1 2 attorneys still engage in various dilatory tactics
in order to avoid disclosing vital information to their adversaries.113
Although severe penalties are available under CPLR 3126 1 4
for refusal to make disclosure, courts have been reluctant to
impose them."5
110 29 App. Div. 2d 404, 288 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1st Dep't 1968).
"'Id. at 407, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 371. See also Gugliano v. Levi, 24 App.
Div. 2d 591, 262 N.Y.S.2d 372 (2d Dep't 1965).
112 Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1st Dep't
1964). The liberal views expressed in Rios were reaffirmed in Allen v.
Crowell-Collier Publishing Company, 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288
N.Y.S2,d 449 (1968).
"13Warner v. Bumgarner, 49 Misc. 2d 488, 267 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1966) (defendant's attempt to avoid disclosure bordered on
the tortious).
"14 CPLR 3126 provides that "[i]f any party ... refuses to obey an order
for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds
ought to have been disclosed, the court may make such orders with regard
to the failure or refusal as are just, among them:
1. an order that issues to which the information is relevant shall be
deemed resolved . . . [in movant's favor] . .. or
2. an order prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses . . . or
3. an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof . or dismissing
the action .. . or rendering a judgment by default against the dis-
obedient party.
While the statute uses the word "order" courts have held that a notice of
disclosure is sufficient. See infra, note 117.
1'2 Coffey v. Orbachs, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 317, 254 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1st
Dep't 1964); Fleming v. Fleming, 50 Misc. 2d 323, 270 N.Y.S.2d 352(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966);. Warner v. Bumgarner, 49 Misc. 2d 488,
267 N.Y.S2d 825 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1966); Di Bartolo v. American
& Foreign Ins. Co., 48 Misc. 2d 843, 265 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1966); Burbell v. Burman, 44 Misc. 2d 749, 255 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1964); Mostow v. Shorr, 44 Misc. 2d 733, 255 N.Y.S.2d
320 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964). Cf. Gaffney v. City of New York,
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In Goldner v. Lendor Structures, Inc.,"1 6 the appellate di-
vision, second department, conditionally granted plaintiff's motion
to impose 3126 penalties on defendant for failing to appear at
pre-trial examinations. The court's holding in Goldner is in
conformity with the views of the first department, 117 i.e., 3126
penalties "apply to notices of examination as well as orders
therefor." 118
The cases arising out of CPLR 3126 have fallen into a
pattern. Although CPLR 3126 contains unequivocal language,
courts have made their 3126 penalty orders only on a conditional
basis. While a litigant should not be deprived of his day in
court because of his attorney's wrongdoing,: 9 refusals to make
disclosure impede the judicial process and consume substantial
amounts of money. A practical solution to this dilemma would
be the continued imposition of substantial attorney's fees as one
of the conditions attached to an order pursuant to CPLR 3126.
CPLR 3140: Interdepartmental conflict develops.
CPLR 3140 mandates that "the appellate division in each
judicial department shall adopt rules governing the exchange of
appraisal reports intended for use at the trial in proceedings for
condemnation. . . ." The rule of the appellate division, second
department, adopted pursuant to CPLR 3140, provides that in
"proceedings for condemnation ... the attorneys for the respective
parties shall file with the clerk of the trial court . . . any ap-
praisal report intended to be used at the trial . . . together with
a separate copy . . . for each adverse party to the claim." In
In re Inwood, 20 claimant sought an exchange of appraisal reports
covering the damaged parcel. The court granted the condemnor's
motion to vacate claimant's notice to exchange appraisal reports
holding that claimant could obtain only those appraisals which
were on file with the clerk of the trial court.
In contrast, the fourth department's implementation of CPLR
3140 requires attorneys to "serve upon their adversaries . . .
a copy of all appraisal reports intended to be used at the trial."
This rule was recently construed in City of Buffalo v. Ives,:"'
41 Misc. 2d 1049, 247 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1964)
(held that 3126 penalties were imposable only after disobedience of
"court order" for disclosure). See also The Quarterly Survey of New
York Practice, 41 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 309 (1966).
11629 App. Div. 2d 978, 289 N.Y.S.2d 687 (2d Dep't 1968).
iSee Coffey v. Orbachs, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 317, 254 N.Y.S.2d 596
(1st Dep't 1964); Nomako v. Ashton, 22 App. Div. 2d 683, 253 N.Y.S2d
309 (1st Dep't 1964).
-18 29 App. Div. 2d at 979, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
39 7B McKIxNEn's CPLR 3126, supp. commentary 124 (1967).
120 55 Misc. 2d 806, 286 N.Y.S.2d 360 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
12155 Misc. 2d 730, 286 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct, Erie County 1968).
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